Unconstitutionality of Government-Funded Foreign Humanitarian Aid from the Originalist Perspective by Alkire, Christina A.
California Western Law Review 
Volume 50 Number 1 Article 4 
2013 
Unconstitutionality of Government-Funded Foreign Humanitarian 
Aid from the Originalist Perspective 
Christina A. Alkire 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr 
Recommended Citation 
Alkire, Christina A. (2013) "Unconstitutionality of Government-Funded Foreign Humanitarian Aid from the 
Originalist Perspective," California Western Law Review: Vol. 50 : No. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol50/iss1/4 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in California Western Law Review by an authorized editor of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu. 
Alkire Final Camera Ready.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2014 10:21 AM 
 
COMMENT 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF GOVERNMENT-FUNDED FOREIGN 
HUMANITARIAN AID FROM THE ORIGINALIST PERSPECTIVE 
                      TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 76 
II.  METHODS AND CANONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION ...................................................................... 79 
III.  GRAMMAR AND USAGE DEMONSTRATE CONGRESSIONAL 
AUTHORITY TO TAX AND SPEND IS LIMITED TO 
ENUMERATED PURPOSES .......................................................... 84 
IV.  CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO TAX AND SPEND IS 
LIMITED TO THE “COMMON DEFENSE” AND “GENERAL 
WELFARE OF THE UNITED STATES” .......................................... 89 
A.  Grammar and Usage Demonstrate Congressional Authority 
to Tax and Spend Is Limited to the “Common Defense” and 
“General Welfare” of the United States ............................. 90 
B.  Foreign Humanitarian Aid Is Not for the “General Welfare” 
or “Common Defense” of the United States ....................... 93 
1.  Any Connection between Bilateral Foreign 
Humanitarian Aid to the Welfare and Defense of the 
United States Is Unproven and Attenuated .................... 98 
2.  Any Connection between Multilateral Foreign 
Humanitarian Aid to the Welfare and Defense of the 
United States Is Virtually Nonexistent ......................... 100 
3.  Neither Bilateral nor Multilateral Humanitarian 
Foreign Aid Serves Any Purpose Directly Related to 
the Defense and Welfare of the United States ............. 101 
V.  HUMAN SUFFERING ELICITS EMOTIONS THAT CAUSE 
CONGRESS TO IGNORE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS .......................................................................... 104 





Alkire: Unconstitutionality of Government-Funded Foreign Humanitarian Aid
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2013
Alkire Final Camera Ready.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2014  10:21 AM 
76 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Virtually nonexistent until the aftermath of World War II,1 
government-funded foreign humanitarian aid has become a significant 
part of United States foreign policy.2  The United States allocates 
billions of dollars to foreign humanitarian aid annually.  In fiscal year3 
2011, the United States obligated4 approximately $31.7 billion dollars 
in bilateral5 economic assistance.  In calendar year6 2011, the United 
States disbursed7 $3.7 billion through multilateral8 organizations.9 
1. The rebuilding of Europe after World War II via the Marshall Plan is cited 
as the beginning of foreign aid.  MARIAN LAWSON & CURT TARNOFF, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R40213, FOREIGN AID: AN INTRODUCTION TO U.S. PROGRAMS 
AND POLICY 2 (2011); Steven J. Wiese, Note, U.S. Foreign Aid Reform: Changing 
Institutional Problems in Order to Meet Modern Day Needs, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV. 747, 747-48 (2009). 
2. See LAWSON & TARNOFF, supra note 1, at 2; see also Wiese, supra note 1, 
at 747-55 (discussing the evolution of U.S. government-funded foreign humanitarian 
aid); Andrew S. Natsios, Foreign Aid Programs Are Important for American 
National Security, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/debate-
club/given-the-current-deficit-crisis-should-foreign-aid-be-cut/foreign-aid-
programs-are-important-for-american-national-security (noting that “nearly every 
American president since WWII . . . has supported a robust [foreign] aid program”); 
Carol Adelman, Foreign Aid Effectively Advancing Security Interests, HARVARD 
INT’L REV., Fall 2007, at 62-63, available at 
http://gpr.hudson.org/files/publications/Harvard %20Review%20-%20Adelman.pdf 
(discussing the “two rationales” for U.S. foreign aid: “economic development and 
US national security”). 
3.  The U.S. defines a fiscal year as beginning on October 1 and ending on 
September 30.  U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Glossary of Terms, USAID, 
http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/about/glossary.html (last updated Jan. 2013).  Each 
fiscal year is “designated by the calendar year in which it ends.”  Id.  
4. An obligation is “[a] binding agreement that will result in outlays, 
immediately or in the future.”  Id. 
5. U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Foreign Assistance Fast Facts, USAID, 
http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/fast-facts.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2013). 
  “Bilateral aid is aid provided directly by a donor country to a recipient country.”  
Sophie Smyth, World Bank Grants in a Changed World Order: How Do We Referee 
This New Paradigm?, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 483, 497 (2008); 1-A H.R. COMM. ON 
INT’L REL. & S. COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., 108TH CONG., LEGISLATION ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS THROUGH 2002, at 23 (J. Comm. Print 2003) (discussing how bilateral 
assistance should be used for projects without “large-scale capital transfers”).  The 
majority of American bilateral aid is administered by the U.S. Agency for 
International Development.  LAWSON & TARNOFF, supra note 1, at 21. 
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Following the State Department’s conceptual “framework,” the 
Congressional Research Service separates American foreign aid into 
“five strategic objectives.”10  “Humanitarian [aid]” is one of those 
objectives.11  This Note’s definition of humanitarian aid is broader 
than the one used by the Congressional Research Service.  Rather, this 
Note defines humanitarian aid as 
unilateral transfers of U.S. resources (funds, goods, and services) 
by the U.S. Government to or for the benefit of foreign entities 
(including international and regional organizations) without any 
reciprocal payment or transfer of resources from the foreign 
entities . . . . [It] is not just confined to funds or commodities, [but] 
also includes the provision of technical assistance, capacity 
building, training, education, and other services, as well as the 
direct costs required to implement foreign assistance.12 
6. A calendar year begins on January 1 and ends on December 31.  CAL. TAX 
SERV. CTR., Calendar Year vs. Fiscal Year, CA.GOV, 
http://www.taxes.ca.gov/Small_Business_Assistance_Center/Calendar/jan.shtml 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2013).  
7. Disbursements are the amounts the U.S. pays through its federal agencies 
“during the fiscal year to liquidate its obligations.”  U.S. Overseas Loans and 
Grants: Foreign Assistance Fast Facts, supra note 5, at 1.  
8. 1-A H.R. COMM. ON INT’L REL. & S. COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., 108TH 
CONG., supra note 5, at 23 (stating that projects involving “large-scale capital 
transfers” should be disbursed “with contributions from other countries working 
together in a multilateral framework”).  “Multilateral aid serves many of the same 
objectives as bilateral developmental assistance, although through different 
channels.”  LAWSON & TARNOFF, supra note 1, at 3. 
9. U.S. Official Development Assistance (ODA) Fast Facts: CY2011, U.S. 
OFFICIAL DEV. ASSISTANCE DATABASE, http://usoda.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/ 
fast_facts.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
10. LAWSON & TARNOFF, supra note 1, at 3.  The five objectives are “Peace 
and Security; Investing in People; Governing Justly and Democratically; Economic 
Growth; and Humanitarian Assistance.”  Id.; see generally Wiese, supra note 1, at 
754 (discussing the evolution of U.S. foreign aid). 
11. LAWSON & TARNOFF, supra note 1, at 3, 6 (“Humanitarian assistance 
responds to both natural and man-made disasters as well as problems resulting from 
conflict associated with failed or failing states.”).  
12. Frequently Asked Questions: General Information, 
FOREIGNASSISTANCE.GOV, http://foreignassistance.gov/FAQ.aspx (last visited Feb. 
12, 2013).  Humanitarian assistance has also been defined as “assistance to meet 
humanitarian needs, including needs for food, medicine, medical supplies and 
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The United States currently provides humanitarian aid13 in response to 
“natural and manmade disasters” and conflicts in “failing or failed 
states.”14  It also provides foreign humanitarian aid in response to 
human rights abuses,15 to “promot[e] economic growth and reduc[e] 
poverty, . . . address[] population growth, expand[] access to basic 
education and health care, protect[] the environment, promot[e] 
stability in conflictive regions, . . . [and to] promot[e] trade.”16 
The constitutional authority to spend taxpayer dollars on foreign 
humanitarian aid has never been seriously questioned.17  Most 
challenges have addressed whether government-funded foreign 
humanitarian aid is good policy.18  Rarely is government-funded 
foreign humanitarian aid analyzed in terms of its constitutionality, as 
this Note does. 
Under the Constitution, Congress only has the authority to spend 
for the “common [d]efense” and “general [w]elfare” of the United 
States.19  Foreign humanitarian aid does not qualify.  In the words of 
Justice Story, the Constitution is “‘of special and enumerated powers, 
equipment, education, and clothing” and the provision of mental and physical 
healthcare and shelter.  1-A H.R. COMM. ON INT’L REL. & S. COMM. ON FOREIGN 
REL., 108TH CONG., supra note 5, at 224-25; LAWSON & TARNOFF, supra note 1, at 
23-24 (noting forms of aid include cash, equipment, food, economic infrastructure, 
training, expertise, and small grants).  
13. Black’s Law Dictionary uses the term “humanitarian intervention” rather 
than humanitarian aid.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 897 (9th ed. 2009).  
14. LAWSON & TARNOFF, supra note 1, at 6.  
15. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 897 (9th ed. 2009). 
16. LAWSON & TARNOFF, supra note 1, at 3.  
17. See Wiese, supra note 1, at 747. 
18. See, e.g., Doug Bandow, Foreign Aid and International Crises, THE 
FREEMAN (Dec. 1, 1996), http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/foreign-aid-and-
international-crises/#axzz2NqrzGdPO (discussing how foreign assistance has failed 
to accomplish its goals and contributes to the survival of brutal regimes); U.S. Aid by 
the Numbers, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (July 31, 2008), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2008/07/31/4673/u-s-aid-
by-the-numbers/. 
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  The original text of the U.S. Constitution 
spells “defense” as “defence.”  This was the proper spelling when the Constitution 
was drafted.  However, this Note will spell the word with an “s” because that is 
consistent with its current spelling. 
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and not of general and unlimited powers.’”20  Specifically, the 
“‘power to lay taxes for the common defen[s]e and general welfare of 
the United States is not in common sense a general power.  It is 
limited to those objects.  It cannot constitutionally transcend them.’”21 
This Note focuses on the unconstitutionality of government-
funded foreign humanitarian aid, arguing that foreign humanitarian 
aid is neither for the “common [d]efense” nor the “general [w]elfare” 
of the United States.22  What is for the common defense and general 
welfare of the United States is limited to those powers enumerated in 
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution.  Furthermore, even if 
government-funded foreign humanitarian aid were found not to be 
limited to those enumerated powers, congressional authority to tax and 
spend is limited to the common defense and general welfare of the 
United States.  There are three reasons why foreign humanitarian aid 
does not meet either of these two requirements.  First, any connection 
between bilateral foreign humanitarian aid and the welfare and 
defense of the United States is unproven and attenuated.  Second, 
there is no connection between foreign humanitarian aid through 
multilateral organizations and the welfare and defense of the United 
States.  Third, neither bilateral nor multilateral foreign humanitarian 
aid serves any purpose directly related to the defense and welfare of 
the United States.  Finally, this Note contends that Congress ignores 
its constitutional limitations when it comes to foreign humanitarian 
aid chiefly because of the powerful emotions that human suffering 
elicits.  While emotions justify private humanitarian aid, emotions do 
not justify unconstitutional government spending. 
II.  METHODS AND CANONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
There are various competing sources of legal textual 
interpretation.23  The two interpretive theories that have come to the 
20. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 909 (5th ed. 
1905)). 
21. Id. (quoting 1 STORY, supra note 20, § 922).  
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
23. Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About State Constitutional Interpretation, 
115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 837, 851 (2011). 
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forefront in recent times are Originalism24 and Evolving 
Constitutionalism.25  Originalists restrict constitutional interpretation 
to the Framers’ words and the assumptions of their era.26  Evolving 
Constitutionalists interpret the Constitution to reflect changes in law 
and society.27  Both Originalists and Evolving Constitutionalists first 
look to the text of the Constitution when analyzing whether something 
is constitutional.28  Here the similarities in interpretive methods end.  
If the text’s meaning is unclear, Originalists look to the legal and 
social tradition of the text’s time.29  Evolving Constitutionalists do 
not.30  Instead, Evolving Constitutionalists look to the prevailing 
morality or social consensus and “mega-conceptions” of justice of 
their own time.31 
Evolving Constitutionalists are critical of Originalism.32  They 
claim that the Framers expected the interpretation of their words 
24. GLENN C. SMITH & PATRICIA FUSCO, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR 
DUMMIES 44-46 (2012).   
25. Id. at 47-48.  Evolving Constitutionalism is also referred to as belief in a 
“[l]iving Constitution.”  See RON PAUL, THE REVOLUTION: A MANIFESTO 48-49 
(2008). 
26. SMITH & FUSCO, supra note 24, at 44.  The era for constitutional 
interpretation refers to the time the Framers of the text adopted the text.  This Note 
focuses on the Bill of Rights and references the Articles of Confederation.  The 
Framers of the Bill of Rights were James Madison and others in the First Federal 
Congress in 1789.  Id. at 45.  The Framers of the Articles of Confederation were the 
men from the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention in 1777.  Id.  
27. Id. at 44; see also Landau, supra note 23, at 854-55.  Evolving 
Constitutionalists argue that because the “Framers intended the [Constitution] to 
serve as a general charter,” “constitutional interpretation must be informed by 
contemporary norms and circumstances, not simply by its original meaning.”  
GOODWIN LIU, PAMELA S. KARLAN & CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, AM. CONST. 
SOC’Y FOR LAW & POL’Y, KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION 25 (2009). 
28. SMITH & FUSCO, supra note 24, at 45-47.   
29. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The 
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws 
(Mar. 8 & 9, 1995), in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES, at 79, 112-20 
(1995), available at http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures//_documents/a-to-
z/s/scalia97.pdf; see also SMITH & FUSCO, supra note 24, at 45-47. 
30. SMITH & FUSCO, supra note 24, at 47.   
31. Id.; see also Landau, supra note 23, at 854-55.   
32. See Landau, supra note 23, at 852-55.  
                                                 
6
California Western Law Review, Vol. 50 [2013], No. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol50/iss1/4
Alkire Final Camera Ready.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2014  10:21 AM 
2013] UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF GOV’T-FUNDED FOREIGN AID 81 
would evolve over time.33  This Note demonstrates that this assertion 
does not find much support in history.  For example, Daniel Webster34 
opined that “‘[w]e must take the meaning of the Constitution as it has 
been solemnly fixed.’”35  Alexander Hamilton’s writings support his 
belief in an Originalist approach.36  William Blackstone was also an 
33. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 79 (2012); see also Scalia, supra note 29, at 112.  
Ron Paul notes that a “living” Constitution is something any government would 
want because whenever people claimed the government overstepped its 
constitutional authority, the government could claim the Constitution had evolved.  
PAUL, supra note 25, at 49; see also Joseph P. Viteritti, A Truly Living Constitution: 
Why Educational Opportunity Trumps Strict Separation on the Voucher Question, 
57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 89, 89 (2000) (quoting Justice William Brennan as 
saying that “[T]he genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might 
have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great 
principles to cope with current problems and current needs”) (alteration in original); 
LIU ET AL., supra note 27, at 25 (noting that Evolving Constitutionalists believe the 
Constitution was intended to “grow and evolve” to reflect the changing “conditions, 
needs, and values of our society”). 
34. Daniel Webster served in Congress and was Secretary of State in both the 
early 1840s and early 1850s.  PAUL, supra note 25, at 56. 
35. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 33, at 80 (quoting DANIEL WEBSTER, THE 
WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 164 (1851)).  
36. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The rules of legal 
interpretation are rules of common sense, adopted by the courts in the construction 
of the laws.  The true test, therefore, of a just application of them is its conformity to 
the source from which they are derived.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 
(Alexander Hamilton) (“For why declare that things shall not be done which there is 
no power to do?  Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press 
shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be 
imposed?  I will not contend that such a provision would confer a regulating power; 
but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretense 
for claiming that power.  They might urge with a semblance of reason, that the 
Constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of providing against the 
abuse of an authority which was not given, and that the provision against restraining 
the liberty of the press afforded a clear implication, that a power to prescribe proper 
regulations concerning it was intended to be vested in the national government.”).  
These quotations demonstrate Hamilton’s Originalist stance.  He was worried that a 
Bill of Rights would result in people interpreting the Constitution so as to grant the 
federal government powers it did not have.  After all, why grant freedoms (e.g., 
through a Bill of Rights), if the federal government does not have the power to 
restrain those freedoms?   
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Originalist.37  As were James Madison,38 Cesare Beccaria,39 Supreme 
Court Justice David Brewer,40 Chief Justice Roger Taney,41 Thomas 
Jefferson,42 and Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black.43 
37. William Blackstone (1723-1780) was an 18th-century English jurist.  
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 33, at 79-80; see also Sir William Blackstone, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/68589/Sir-William-Blackstone (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2013).  Blackstone’s belief in Originalism was evident when he 
discussed an 11th-century law that forbid all “ecclesiastical persons to ‘purchase 
provisions at Rome.’”  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 33, at 79-80 (quoting 1 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 60 (4th ed., 
1770)).  Blackstone noted that those words “‘might seem to prohibit the buying of 
grain or other victual.’”  Id.  However, such an interpretation is incorrect because 
“provisions” in the eleventh century referred to ecclesiastical-office appointments.  
Id.  Therefore, giving “provision” any other meaning would be incorrect.  Id. 
38. James Madison, one of the Constitution’s architects and an author of the 
Bill of Rights, questioned how laws could be fixed in their meaning and operation if 
the meaning of the Constitution was not.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 33, at 80 
(quoting Letter from James Madison to C.E. Haynes (Feb. 25, 1821)).  
39. “Cesare Beccaria, the . . . son of an Italian nobleman, published a short 
treatise, Dei delitti e delle pene, that was translated into English as On Crimes and 
Punishments.”  John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, 
America’s Death Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J.L. &  SOC. POL’Y  
195, 196 (2009).  He influenced many thinkers, including the American Founding 
Fathers as his writings “profoundly shaped the country’s founding era and the Bill of 
Rights.”  Id. at 207.  
When the code of laws is once fixed, it should be observed in the literal 
sense, and nothing more is left to the judge, than to determine, whether an 
action be, or be not conformable to the written law.  When the rule of 
right, which ought to direct the actions of the philosopher, as well as the 
ignorant, is a matter of controversy, not of fact, the people are slaves to the 
magistrates. 
CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 24 (Henry Paolucci trans., 1963) 
(4th ed. 1793).  
40. See South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905) (“The 
Constitution is a written instrument.  As such its meaning does not alter.  That which 
it meant when adopted, it means now.”).   
41. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 425-26 (1856) (“[A]s it is a 
Government of special, delegated, powers, no authority beyond . . . can be 
constitutionally exercised.”). 
42. See GEORGE FRATER, OUR HUMANIST HERITAGE 126-27 (2010) (“‘The 
Constitution on which our Union rests, shall be administered by me [as President] 
according to the safe and honest meaning contemplated by the plain understanding 
of the people of the United States at the time of its adoption — a meaning to be 
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Furthermore, if the Constitution were intended to evolve, 
including an amendment to change the Constitution would be 
superfluous.44  For example, the Thirteenth and Nineteenth 
Amendments would have been unnecessary.45  In the words of 
Alexander Hamilton, “the present Constitution is the standard to 
which we are to cling.  Under its banners, . . . must we combat our 
political foes—rejecting all changes but through the channel itself 
provides for amendments.”46 
According to some, Originalism is the only method of 
interpretation compatible with democracy.47  Giving legal texts new 
meaning is changing the law.48  Another word for change is amend.49  
found in the explanations of those who advocated, not those who opposed it, and 
who opposed it merely lest the construction should be applied which they denounced 
as possible.’”) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mesrs. Eddy, Russel, 
Thurber, Wheaton and Smith (Mar. 27, 1801)).  Thomas Jefferson’s Originalist 
stance is important because Jefferson was the principal author of the Declaration of 
Independence.  The fact that Congress appointed Jefferson as one of five men to 
draft this document is demonstrative of the respect Jefferson engendered.  
FOUNDING FATHERS, available at 
http://www.smithsonianeducation.org/spotlight/july4.html; THOMAS JEFFERSON 
(1743-1826), AM. HIST. CENT., available at 
http://www.americanhistorycentral.com/entry.php?rec=453.  
43. Justice Hugo Black is cited as the most prominent Originalist from the 
1940s through the 1960s.  DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 8 (2010).  
His belief in an Originalist interpretation is noteworthy because of his “liberal-
humanist-individualistic philosophy.”  Raymond G. Decker, Justice Hugo L. Black: 
The Balancer of Absolutes, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1335, 1344 (1971). 
44. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.  Evolving Constitutionalists deny this 
assertion.  Citing changes to population and technology as examples, they claim 
that, because the process of amending the Constitution is lengthy and difficult, it is 
unrealistic to expect this process to keep up with the frequent changes to U.S. 
society.  See STRAUSS, supra note 43, at 8-9. 
45. If the Constitution were intended to evolve with society, constitutional 
amendments would have been unnecessary to give African Americans and women 
the right to vote.  See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 33, at 80-81.   
46. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James A. Bayard (April 1802), in 10 
THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, at 434 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons 1904) (emphasis added), available at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Fti
tle=1387&chapter=93528&layout=html&Itemid=27.  
47. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 33, at 82-85. 
48. Id. at 82. 
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To amend the Constitution, however, requires compliance with the 
Fifth Amendment.50  For these reasons, and because Evolving 
Constitutionalists believe the Constitution “must keep changing in its 
application or lose even its original meaning,”51 this Note largely 
focuses on the Originalist method of interpreting the Constitution. 
Consistent with the Originalist method of interpretation is the use 
of interpretative canons.52  These interpretative canons are not found 
within any one source.53  Rather, they are gathered from various legal 
sources.54  A canon of construction “guides the interpreter of a text on 
some phase of the interpretive process.”55  Some of these canons will 
be used throughout this Note to interpret relevant parts of the 
Constitution to show that Congress does not have the constitutional 
authority to spend tax revenue for foreign humanitarian aid. 
III.  GRAMMAR AND USAGE DEMONSTRATE CONGRESSIONAL 
AUTHORITY TO TAX AND SPEND IS LIMITED TO ENUMERATED 
PURPOSES 
Government-funded foreign humanitarian aid is unconstitutional 
because it does not fall within the enumerated powers of Congress, 
which limit what is for the general welfare and common defense.56  
49. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 94 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “amend” as “[t]o 
change the wording of; specif., to formally alter . . . by striking out, inserting, or 
substituting words.”). 
50. See PAUL, supra note 25, at 45-46 (discussing the Founders’ concern that 
there would always be temptation to take more power than the Constitution 
authorized and the time consuming process of amending the Constitution increased 
this temptation to just take the power without amending the Constitution); see also 
U.S. CONST. amend. V.   
51. Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the 
‘Living Constitution’, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456, 1463 (2001). 
52. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 33, at 78-79. 
53. Id. at 9 (discussing that this book is arguably the first modern attempt to 
compile and arrange valid canons and explain their validity). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 426. 
56. See e.g., PAUL, supra note 25, at 44 (noting that Article I, Section 8 
provides an exhaustive list of congressional powers). 
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This conclusion is supported by the grammar and usage of Article I, 
Section 8, of the Constitution.57 
Semicolons may be used “between items in a list that already 
involve commas.”58  The use of the semicolons in Article I, Section 8, 
“preserves the unity of the clause” and the “true intention of the 
parties to the Constitution.”59  It preserves the clause’s unity because 
it unites two parts in one substantive clause.60  The first part of the 
clause gives Congress the power “[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises” and is called the “first” part of a “single” 
clause.61  The second part limits and explains what is in the general 
welfare and for the common defense of the United States.62  The 
limiting and explanatory nature of the second part of the clause is thus 
supported by the clause’s structure.  The remainder of Section 8 is 
separated into clauses that are divided by semicolons.63  This creates a 
list of enumerated powers that explain what is for the common 
defense and in the general welfare.  Had the Framers, therefore, 
intended to separate the first clause from the following enumerated 
powers, they would have used more than a semicolon.64 
After the initial section that gives Congress the power to tax and 
spend, the enumerated powers are listed and each power begins with 
“To.”65  This shows that these enumerated powers are explanations of 
what is in the common defense and for the general welfare.66  If taxing 
and spending for the general welfare and common defense were meant 
to stand alone, Section 8 would have included these two things as part 
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
58. Jaclyn M. Wells, Semi-Colons, Colons, and Quotation Marks, PURDUE 
OWL, 
http://owl.english.purdue.edu/engagement/index.php?category_id=2&sub_category_
id=1&article_id=44 (last edited Mar. 29, 2013). 
59. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson (Nov. 27, 1830), in THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000). 
60. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
61. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59. 
62. James Madison, The Bank Bill (Feb. 2, 1791), in THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000). 
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
64. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison). 
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
66. James Madison, supra note 62. 
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of the list.  For example, Section 8 would have begun by giving 
Congress the power to tax without including that this power is to 
“provide for the common Defen[s]e and general Welfare.”67  Rather, 
if what is in the general welfare and for the common defense is not 
limited to the enumerated powers that follow, it would have been 
included as another enumerated power in the list.68 
Furthermore, not limiting congressional power to tax and spend to 
these listed purposes would give Congress the equivalent of unlimited 
power and the listing would therefore have been unnecessary.69  If not 
limited to those enumerated powers, Congress could tax and spend for 
reasons other than to pay debts or for the general welfare and common 
defense of the United States.70  Congress would not be confined to its 
enumerated powers and could interfere with powers reserved to the 
states.71  Instead, Congress would simply be able to justify any actions 
in excess of those enumerated as in the general welfare and for the 
common defense of the United States.72 
If these terms were not limited to the succeeding enumerated 
powers, the terms would be unnecessary.73  There would be no reason 
to include the enumerated powers if the terms “common [d]efense” 
and “general [w]elfare” were general terms not limited to those 
enumerated powers.74  “For what purpose could the enumeration of 
powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included 
in the preceding general power?”75  Therefore, the proper way to look 
at these terms is as limits on congressional power to tax and spend.  
“Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general 
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
68. See James Madison, supra note 62.  
69. Id.; PAUL, supra note 25, at 47 (noting that there would be no point of 
listing the enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8 if they were to be included 
within the broad definition of “general welfare”).  
70. See James Madison, supra note 62.  It would have been unnecessary to 
include the subjoined “To” clauses if those clauses were not meant to define what 
was in the general welfare or for the common defense of the United States.  Id.   
71. Id. 
72. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison). 
73. James Madison, supra note 62. 
74. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison); see also PAUL, supra note 25, 
at 47. 
75. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison). 
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phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars.”76  
As such, what is in the general welfare and for the common defense is 
limited by the section’s enumerated powers.77 
This argument is consistent with the Originalist belief that the 
delegates at the Constitutional Convention would not have given 
Congress unbridled discretion.78  If not limited to those enumerated 
powers, Congress would have so much discretion that it would have 
the equivalent of unlimited power.  Congress could arguably tax and 
spend for any purpose it justified as being for the general welfare and 
common defense of the United States.79  This argument that 
congressional power to tax and spend is limited to those enumerated 
powers is supported by Jefferson’s belief that a proposed federal law 
was unconstitutional if not listed among the powers granted to 
Congress in Article I, Section 8.80 
The argument that the delegates and ratifiers of the Constitution 
would not have given Congress unbridled discretion is further 
supported by the “peculiar” structure of the federal government.81  
The government “combines an equal representation of unequal 
76. Id.  
77. See id. 
78. See e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that bills 
of rights historically served to limit a government’s otherwise unlimited power, 
which was unnecessary with the U.S. Constitution because it is “founded upon the 
power of the people . . . [and where] . . . the people surrender nothing; and as they 
retain every thing, they have no need of particular reservations”).  Hamilton opined 
that bills of rights were unnecessary to the U.S. Constitution because “[t]hey would 
contain various exceptions to powers not granted.”  For example, Hamilton thought 
a provision granting freedom of the press was unnecessary because the Constitution 
did not give the federal government the power over the press.  Id. 
79. See PAUL, supra note 25, at 48 (referencing Patrick Henry’s concern when 
the ratification of the Constitution was being debated in Virginia).  Henry was 
concerned that the government could do anything it claimed was in the general 
welfare.  Id.  In response, constitutional supporters noted this phrase did not 
authorize such broad meaning.  Id. 
80. Id. at 45.  Jefferson is quoted as saying that “‘Congress has not unlimited 
powers to provide for the General Welfare, but only those specifically enumerated.’” 
GEORGE M. STEPHENS, LOCKE, JEFFERSON & THE JUSTICES: FOUNDATIONS AND 
FAILURES OF THE US GOVERNMENT 99 (2002); see also THOMAS JEFFERSON (1743-
1826), supra note 42 (discussing why Jefferson’s opinion is highly relevant to what 
the Framers intended when drafting and ratifying the Constitution). 
81. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59. 
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numbers in one branch of the Legislature . . . an equal representation 
of equal numbers in the other” and “invests the Government with 
selected powers only.”82  These peculiarities were intended to be 
safeguards against government persecution of minorities or 
institutions.83  The peculiar structure of the government proves that 
the ratifiers were apprehensive of “abuse from ambition or 
corruption.”84  Therefore, it is unreasonable to suggest that these same 
men would allow the government to have unbridled discretion in 
determining what was in the general welfare or for the common 
defense of the United States. 
Furthermore, the Framers would not have used the terms “general 
[w]elfare” and “common [d]efense” if they were not limited to the 
enumerated powers that followed those phrases.85  If not limited, they 
would be general terms.86  It is hard to conclude that such general 
terms would be used in the Constitution, when the Framers were 
otherwise so precise.87 
Limiting what is in the general welfare and for the common 
defense of the United States to those enumerated powers is also 
supported by the lack of attention the Framers paid to these terms.  
Framers who were particularly fearful of a strong central government 





86. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59; PAUL, 
supra note 25, at 47 (quoting Madison as saying that “[w]ith respect to the words 
general welfare, I have always regarded them as qualified by the detail of powers 
connected with them.  To take them in a literal and unlimited sense would be a 
metamorphosis of the Constitution into a character which there is a host of proofs 
was not contemplated by its creators”). 
87. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59.  For 
example, Article I, Section 8, specifically authorizes Congress to tax “for the 
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.  These 
provisions would be for the common defense of the United States.  Therefore, if 
“common [d]efense” was intended to encompass anything Congress could arguably 
say was for the common defense of the United States, it is nonsensical to suggest 
that the delegates would have included these specific examples.  Rather, it is more 
likely that these examples were specifying what was for the common defense.  
Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59. 
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[d]efense.”88  “[F]or it exceeds the possibility of belief, that the known 
advocates in the Convention for a jealous grant and cautious definition 
of Federal powers should have silently permitted the introduction of 
words or phrases in a sense rendering fruitless the restrictions and 
definitions elaborated by them.”89 
A majority of the proposed amendments at the Constitutional 
Convention were to “circumscribe the powers granted to the General 
Government, by explanations, restrictions, or prohibitions.”90  At least 
seven states proposed one hundred twenty-six amendments for this 
purpose.91  These states “saw [the] danger in terms and phrases 
employed in some of the most minute and limited of the enumerated 
powers.”92  However, not one state addressed the terms “common 
defense” and “general welfare” as a source of concern.93  It therefore 
follows that the ratifying states believed the terms were “explained 
and limited, as in the ‘Articles of Confederation,’ by the enumerated 
powers which followed them.”94 
IV.  CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO TAX AND SPEND IS LIMITED TO 
THE “COMMON DEFENSE” AND “GENERAL WELFARE  
OF THE UNITED STATES” 
Congress has the power to “lay and collect [t]axes, [d]uties, 
[i]mposts and [e]xcises, to pay the [d]ebts and provide for the 
common [d]efense and general [w]elfare of the United States.”95  This 
section of the Constitution gives Congress the power to tax and 
appropriate.96  These are words of limitation and would not have been 





92. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59.  
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
96. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936). 
97. Id. 
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The terms “general [w]elfare” and “common [d]efense” were not 
novel to the Constitution.98  These terms were carried over from the 
Articles of Confederation.99  They “were regarded in the new as in the 
old instrument, merely as general terms, explained and limited by the 
subjoined specifications.”100  One way the Constitution altered the 
Articles of Confederation was by providing the federal government 
the means to generate revenue.101  However, the Constitution did not 
alter the purpose of that revenue and the terms “general [w]elfare” and 
“common [d]efense” were maintained.102 
The following sections will show that the grammar and usage of 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, as well as the intent of the 
Constitution’s Framers and ratifiers, was to limit Congress’ taxing and 
spending powers to the common defense and general welfare of the 
United States.103  They will also show that foreign humanitarian aid is 
neither for the common defense nor the general welfare of the United 
States. 
A.  Grammar and Usage Demonstrate Congressional Authority to Tax 
and Spend Is Limited to the “Common Defense” and “General 
Welfare” of the United States 
“Words are to be given the meaning that proper grammar and 
usage would assign them.”104  In the words of Chief Justice Warren, 
the Supreme Court does not “regard ordinary principles of English 
prose as irrelevant to a construction of [congressional] enactments.”105  
This canon and Chief Justice Warren’s insight show that the use of 
semicolons and the structure of Section 8 limit Congress’ authority to 
98. James Madison, supra note 62 (“These terms are copied from the articles 
of confederation . . . .”). 
99. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VIII, para. 1; Letter from 
James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59. 
100. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59. 
101. Brutus, No. 7 (Jan. 3, 1788), in THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (Philip B. 
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000).  
102. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59. 
103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
104. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 33, at 140. 
105. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 150 (1960). 
                                                 
16
California Western Law Review, Vol. 50 [2013], No. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol50/iss1/4
Alkire Final Camera Ready.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2014  10:21 AM 
2013] UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF GOV’T-FUNDED FOREIGN AID 91 
tax and spend for the common defense and general welfare of the 
United States.106 
The first session of the First Federal Congress further 
demonstrates that the terms “common [d]efense” and “general 
[w]elfare” were meant to limit congressional power.107  The 
representatives’ discussion of proposed constitutional amendments 
demonstrated their desire to limit the federal government’s power.108  
However, no amendment or proposal was made regarding the terms 
“common [d]efense” and “general [w]elfare.”109  It is unreasonable 
that men who “[criticized] and combated” the “many inferior and 
minute powers” in the Constitution would ignore these terms if they 
imposed “unlimited taxes for unlimited purposes.”110  Rather, by these 
terms, taxes were limited to providing for the common defense and 
general welfare of the United States.111 
Consistent with the lack of concern of the constitutional delegates 
and the First Congress, there was a lack of reliance on these terms to 
justify congressional action.112  For example, the First Bank of the 
United States113 was justified as being 
of primary importance to the prosperous administration of the 
finances, and  . . . of the greatest utility in the operations connected 
with the support of the Public Credit . . . which will entitle it to the 
106. James Madison, supra note 62.  
107. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59. 
108. Id.  
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id.; Justice Story also noted that Congress may only tax for the common 
defense and general welfare of the United States.  3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 381-82 (1833), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/js/js_314.htm. 
112. See infra text accompanying notes 114-25. 
113. The First Bank was “conceived in 1790” and created in 1791 to “help 
fund the [United States’ war] debt and issue currency notes.”  A History of Central 
Banking in the United States, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/community_education/student/centralbankhistory/ba
nk.cfm? (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). 
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confidence, and be likely to render it equal to the exigencies, of the 
public.114 
Hamilton noted the importance of a national bank “in dangerous and 
distressing emergencies.”115  It is noteworthy that Hamilton did not 
support these justifications as being for the welfare or defense of the 
United States.116  Rather, he relied on the Constitution’s concern with 
protecting property.117  In his opinion, the First Bank would attract 
foreign capital and provide consistency and stability.118 
Similarly, prior to the adoption of the Constitution, Representative 
Wilson justified the constitutionality of a national bank in 1785 from 
the text of Article V of the Articles of Confederation, “that for the 
more convenient management of the general interests of the United 
States, delegates shall be annually appointed to meet in congress.”119  
Wilson looked at a national bank as a way of managing the nation.120  
He believed the Articles of Confederation authorized a national bank 
because an “institution for circulating paper, and establishing its credit 
over the whole United States” was within the “general powers” and in 
the “general interests of the United States.”121  Wilson was “justly 
distinguished for his intellectual powers” and was “deeply impressed 
with the importance of a bank at such a crisis.”122  However, Madison 
114. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE 
TREASURY ON THE SUBJECT OF A NATIONAL BANK 3 (1790), available at 
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/bankunitedstates/bankoftheunitedstates_hamilton_17
90.pdf. 
115. Id. at 4. 
116. Id. at 4-9.  
117. See id. 
118. Id. at 20. 
119. JAMES WILSON, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE BANK OF NORTH AMERICA 
(1785), reprinted in 1 JAMES WILSON, COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 64 
(Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007), available at 
http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2072/Wilson_4140_EBk_v6.0.pdf (quoting 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. V, para. 1).  Representative Wilson was 
only one of six individuals who signed both the Declaration of Independence and the 
U.S. Constitution.  Id. at 2-3 (discussing Wilson’s impact on the founding of the 
United States).  
120. Id. at 64. 
121. Id. 
122. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, supra note 59. 
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found Wilson’s justification for a national bank “particularly worthy 
of notice” because it shed light on the proper interpretation of the 
common defense and general welfare provisions in both the Articles 
of Confederation and later the U.S. Constitution.123  Wilson justified a 
national bank from the “nature” of the “union” and the “tenor of the 
‘Articles of Confederation’ themselves,” without considering the 
“terms ‘common defen[s]e and “general welfare’ as a source” of that 
power.124 
Wilson’s lack of reliance on the terms “common defense” and 
“general welfare” is of particular importance because, while pre-
Constitution, the terms of “general welfare” and “common defense” 
were carried over from the Articles of Confederation to the 
Constitution.125  Thus, the rationales provided by both Hamilton and 
Wilson would arguably work for the general welfare and common 
defense of the United States.  However, neither Hamilton nor Wilson 
relied on these terms to justify a national bank.126  This lack of 
reliance shows the limitations of the “general [w]elfare” and 
“common [d]efense” provisions. 
B.  Foreign Humanitarian Aid Is Not for the “General Welfare” or 
“Common Defense” of the United States 
The Constitution should be interpreted as reflecting “what an 
informed, reasonable member of the community would have 
understood at the time of adoption according to then-prevailing 
linguistic meaning and interpretive principles.”127  One limitation on 
Congress’ authority is the qualifier that taxing and spending be for the 
common defense and general welfare “of the United States.”128 
The Journals of the Continental Congress repeatedly reference the 




126. See supra text accompanying notes 113-26. 
127. BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 642 (3d ed. 
2011). 
128. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
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States and its citizens.129  With phrases such as “of these States”; 
“frontier inhabitants”; “common benefit of the Union”; “the people of 
these United States, by whose will, and for whose benefit the federal 
government was instituted”; and “the interest and welfare of those 
whom [Congress] represent[s],” there is no question that the general 
welfare was of the United States and its citizens.130 
Congress largely ignores this limitation that taxing and spending 
be for the general welfare and common defense of the United States.  
This is evident in the language of congressional legislation.  For 
example, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 states that a 
principal objective of the foreign policy of the United States is the 
encouragement and sustained support of the people of developing 
countries in their efforts to acquire the knowledge and resources 
essential to development and to build the economic, political, and 
social institutions which will improve the quality of their lives.131 
American history shows that foreign humanitarian aid was not 
considered to be for the general welfare or in the common defense of 
the United States.132  In 1794, the House of Representatives addressed 
the constitutionality of federal spending on humanitarian grounds.133  
French refugees fled to the United States in response to the French 
Revolution.134  Maryland’s legislature requested that the federal 
129. See Journals of the Continental Congress (Feb. 15, 1786) in THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000), available 
at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_1s1.html (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2013).  
130. Id.; Alexander Hamilton also noted the necessity of the Constitution to 
advance the “safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed.”  THE 
FEDERALIST NO.1 (Alexander Hamilton). 
131. 1-A H.R. COMM. ON INT’L REL. & S. COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., supra 
note 5, at 19 (emphasis added). 
132. See infra text accompanying notes 135-50. 
133. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 169-73 (1794). Though the discussion concerned 
humanitarian aid within the United States, it applied to federal spending on 
humanitarian causes in general, both domestic and foreign.  Id. 
134. Id. at 169.  See generally OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, The United States and the French Revolution, 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/FrenchRev (last visited Mar. 30, 2013) 
(discussing the French Revolution, America’s involvement, and French emigrants in 
the United States). 
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government provide funds to aid the emigrants.135  In response, James 
Madison “acknowledged . . . he could not undertake to lay his finger 
on that article in the Federal Constitution which granted a right to 
Congress of expending, on objects of benevolence, the money of their 
constituents.”136 
Madison distinguished the British Constitution from the U.S. 
Constitution.  He stated that the British Constitution gave the British 
Parliament an “indefinite and absolute right in disposing of the money 
of their constituents.”137  In contrast, the House of Representatives did 
not “possess an undefined authority correspondent with that of a 
British Parliament.”138  Therefore, while Madison sympathized with 
the French emigrants, he believed Congress simply did not have the 
authority to grant them aid.139 
 Representative Giles also doubted that such spending was 
legal.140  He disagreed with those representatives who would authorize 
spending based on “humanity.”141  Giles stated that the proper 
question was not whether such spending was humane.142  Rather, the 
question was whether, “under the Constitution, we have a right to 
make such grant?”143 
Justice Story also believed foreign humanitarian aid was 
unconstitutional.144  Story provides examples of expenditures that 
135. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 169 (1794). 
136. Id. at 170.  James Madison “wished to relieve the sufferers, but was 
afraid of establishing a dangerous precedent, which might . . . be perverted to the 
countenance of purposes very different from those of charity.”  Id.  
137. Id. at 171 (citing an instance when the British Parliament authorized one 
hundred thousand pounds to support Lisbon after an earthquake). 
138. Id. at 171-73 (noting that the various state legislatures had “more 
extensive” “power over the purses of their constituents” than is afforded to Congress 
under the U.S. Constitution).  Madison noted that “[h]e was satisfied that the citizens 
of the United States possessed an equal degree of magnanimity, generosity and 
benevolence, with the people of Britain, but this House certainly did not possess an 
undefined authority correspondent with that of a British Parliament.”  Id. 
139. Id. at 170-72. 
140. Id. at 173. 
141. Id. 
142. Id.  
143. Id.; see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) (noting that the 
government may only act within constitutional limitations).   
144. See 3 STORY, supra note 112, at 381-82. 
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were not for the common defense or in the general welfare of the 
United States.145  He notes that purposes “wholly extraneous”146 to the 
common defense or general welfare of the United States included 
“giving aids and subsidies to a foreign nation.”147  According to Story, 
such foreign aid and subsidies were “wholly indefensible upon 
constitutional principles.”148 
Despite this history and the lack of connection between foreign 
humanitarian aid and the common defense and general welfare of the 
United States, Congress spends billions of dollars on foreign 
humanitarian aid every year.149  Foreign humanitarian aid is justified 
for reasons that include promoting economic growth and reducing 
poverty; improving governance; addressing population growth; 
expanding access to basic education and health care; protecting the 
environment; promoting stability in conflict regions; protecting human 
rights; curbing weapons proliferation; strengthening allies; and 
addressing drug production and trafficking.150  Those justifications 
that are related to democratizing foreign countries are arguably the 
most related to the general welfare and common defense of the United 
States. 
Much of the time, proponents of foreign humanitarian aid do not 
attempt to link these justifications to the common defense or general 
145. Id.  
146. Id. 
147. Id.  Justice Story also notes that taxing for the purpose of “propagating 
Mahometanism among the Turks, or giving aids and subsidies to a foreign nation” is 
not constitutional because it is not for the common defense or in the general welfare 
of the United States.  Id.  
148. Id.   
A power to lay taxes for the common defen[s]e and general welfare of the 
United States is not in common sense a general power.  It is limited to 
those objects.  It cannot constitutionally transcend them.  If the defen[s]e 
proposed by a tax be not the common defen[s]e of the United States, if the 
welfare be not general, but special, or local . . . it is not within the scope of 
the [C]onstitution. 
Id.  
149. U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Foreign Assistance Fast Facts, 
USAID, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/fast-facts.html (last visited Mar. 22, 
2013). 
150. LAWSON & TARNOFF, supra note 1, at 3. 
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welfare of the United States.151  When they do attempt to make this 
connection, the connections are inadequate because proponents do not 
explain how foreign humanitarian aid is for the welfare and defense of 
the United States.152  Any cause-and-effect between the aid and the 
desired result is unproven and attenuated.153 
151. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 
Stat. 3 (2004) (justifying foreign aid spending for agriculture, rural development, 
food and drug administration); Bretton Woods Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 79-171, 
59 Stat. 512 (1945) (justifying U.S. participation in multilateral development banks 
for reconstruction and development); Support for Eastern European Democracy 
(SEED) Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-179, §§ 2, 801, 103 Stat. 3, 26 (justifying 
foreign aid spending to support East European democracy; only mention of U.S. 
national security is Act’s authorization to allow President to cut off aid to countries 
engaged in activities deemed contrary to U.S. national security); United States 
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 
108-25, 117 Stat. 711 (2012) (no attempt to justify this aid as being for the common 
defense or general welfare of the United States); Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, 
Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 211 (2004) (justifying foreign aid for  “economic 
growth and the elimination of extreme poverty and [to] strengthen[] good 
governance, economic freedom, and investments in people”); but see, e.g., 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-480, 
68 Stat. 454-55 (1954) (justifying foreign aid spending “[t]o increase the 
consumption of United States agricultural commodities in foreign countries, to 
improve the foreign relations of the United States, and for other purposes” and to 
“promote the economic stability of American agriculture and the national welfare”).  
152. See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 
424 (1961) (claiming foreign aid for economic development and internal and 
external security promoted the security and general welfare of the United States); 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-480, 
68 Stat. 454-55 (1954) (justifying foreign aid in the form of agricultural 
commodities as in the “national welfare” of the United States); see also Andrew S. 
Natsios, Foreign Aid Programs are Important for American National Security, U.S. 
NEWS (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/given-the-current-
deficit-crisis-should-foreign-aid-be-cut/foreign-aid-programs-are-important-for-
american-national-security (making the conclusory statement that cutting foreign aid 
will “diminish our position in the world as a great power” and weaken U.S. national 
security); Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID, 
http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization/bureaus/bureau-democracy-conflict-
and-humanitarian-assistance (last visited June 15, 2013) (justifying U.S. foreign aid 
as “furthering United States national security broadly defined”). 
153. Simeon Djankov, Jose G. Montalvo & Marta Reynal-Querol, Does 
Foreign Aid Help?, 26 CATO J., 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2006/1/cj26n1-
1.pdf; see also PAUL, supra note 25, at 18-19. 
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1.  Any Connection between Bilateral Foreign Humanitarian Aid to 
the Welfare and Defense of the United States Is Unproven and 
Attenuated 
Proponents of foreign humanitarian aid claim this aid helps the 
democratization of recipient countries.154  Democratic countries are 
seen as U.S. allies,155 most recently in the War on Terror.156  
Therefore, a common argument is that foreign humanitarian aid 
promotes the general welfare and common defense of the United 
States by limiting potential adversaries and strengthening allies.157  
Evidence from history does not give this proposition much support.158 
For several reasons, foreign humanitarian aid has little or no 
favorable effect on democratizing foreign countries.159  One reason is 
154. SUSAN B. EPSTEIN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34296, 
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION: CORNERSTONE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY? 7-9 (2007), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34296.pdf.  
155. Id. at 8; but cf. id. at 10 (citing JOANNE GOWA, BALLOTS AND BULLETS 
113 (1999)).  Gowa argues that history does not support the so-called “democracy 
peace theory.”  Id. at 10.  Rather, she attributes the so-called “democracy peace 
theory” to similar interests and the “bipolar balance in the world after World War 
II.”  Id.  Gowa also notes that “democratic peace [was] a Cold War phenomenon . . . 
limited to the years between 1946 and 1980.”  Id. 
156. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 155, at 7-8; cf. Aloke Chakravarty, 
Feeding Humanity, Starving Terror: The Utility of Aid in a Comprehensive 
Antiterrorism Financing Strategy, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 295 (2010) (arguing 
that foreign humanitarian aid will help delegitimize terrorist organizations and 
promote goodwill towards the United States).  
157. See FPI Analysis: Foreign Aid Advances U.S. Security, Prosperity, and 
Global Leadership, FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVE (Feb. 25, 2013), 
http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/fpi-analysis-foreign-aid-advances-us-
security-prosperity-and-global-leadership; see also Chakravarty, supra note 157 at 
326 (arguing that “[b]y supporting development goals, such as educating 
governments, building up civil institutions, and buttressing the economic 
infrastructure, as well as humanitarian goals, such as reducing poverty, increasing 
food assistance, and providing access to basic medical care, the United States[’] 
interests will slowly, but deeply, be reinforced in the psyche of the citizens of the 
recipient countries”). 
158. For example, the U.S. government has provided foreign aid to Pakistan 
for over 20 years.  Adelman, supra note 2, at 65.  Despite this aid, “anti-American 
sentiment” in Pakistan has not diminished.  Id.  
159. Stephen Knack, Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy? 5, 15, 18-20 
(IRIS Center Working Paper No. 238, 2000), available at 
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that “most aid goes to [the foreign] government[] [rather than the 
actual people in need], which “‘strengthen[s] the role of the 
government in [the economy compared] to the private sector.’”160  
Democracy is not likely to result when the government controls much 
of the economy.161  Because foreign humanitarian aid strengthens the 
government’s role in the economy, and because strong government 
involvement in the economy hinders democratization, foreign 
humanitarian aid does little to bring democracy to foreign countries.162 
Foreign humanitarian aid is, furthermore, an ineffective tool for 
democratization, despite the often futile conditions that usually 
accompany this aid.163  Aid and the conditions on it may weaken 
government accountability and the rule of law,164  Government 
accountability and the rule of law are two important foundations of 
democracy.165  Aid also “can reinforce ‘presidentialism.’”166  
“Presidentialism” occurs “in new democracies [when a] weak 
legislature provid[es] few checks on the president and cabinet, which 
dominate political decision-making.”167  Conditions on aid can give 
the executive branch of recipient countries the power to “‘exact 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=260047 (noting that even aid 
from USAID, which directs aid towards countries progressing towards 
democratization, has no significant association with democratization); see also 
Katherine Erbeznik, Note, Money Can’t Buy You Law: The Effects of Foreign Aid 
on the Rule of Law in Developing Countries, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 873 
(2011).  
160. Knack, supra note 160, at 5 (quoting Milton Friedman).  
161. Id. 
162. See id. at 1 (noting that successful democratizing programs are rare). 
163. Id. at 6 (citing INT’L FIN. INST. ADVISORY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT TO 
THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE (2000)).  For example, section 7046(c) of the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 conditioned U.S. aid to Pakistan on 
Pakistan’s cooperation with U.S. counterterrorism efforts and Pakistan allowing 
humanitarian organizations access to detainees, civilians, and internally displaced 
people.  SUSAN B. EPSTEIN  & K. ALAN KRONSTADT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R41856, PAKISTAN: U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 32-33 (2013), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41856.pdf. 
164. Knack, supra note 160, at 5-6. 
165. Id.  
166. Id. at 6. 
167. Id. (citing DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, AID DEPENDENCE & GOVERNANCE 29 
(2000)); see also Djankov et al., supra note 154, at 11. 
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concessions from their legislatures.’”168  This results in a shift of 
power within recipient countries “‘that distort the constitutionally 
established system of checks and balances’” that are required in a 
democracy.169 
2.  Any Connection between Multilateral Foreign Humanitarian Aid to 
the Welfare and Defense of the United States Is Virtually Nonexistent 
Foreign humanitarian aid through multilateral agencies is also 
ineffective and similarly does not promote the defense and welfare of 
the United States.  Such aid is ineffective partly because 
“[m]ultilateral donors such as the World Bank are generally precluded 
by their charters from explicitly advocating or promoting 
democratization.”170  Therefore, multilateral agencies are not allowed 
to further the one purpose of aid that is at least arguably related to the 
defense and welfare of the United States. 
In addition to this limitation, multilateral agencies have a history 
of ineffectiveness.171  For example, the World Bank spent $180 
million dollars on the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline.172  The World 
Bank tried to prevent corruption by conditioning the pipeline on 
Chad’s promising to spend the revenue on education, health, and 
infrastructure.173  This did not happen.174  Once the Chad government 
started receiving revenue from the pipeline, it “reneged on its deal 
with the World Bank,” “weakened the regulation” that allocated “most 
of its oil revenue to . . . poverty reduction programs,” and “diverted” 
some of the revenue towards arms acquisitions.175 
168. Knack, supra, note 160 at 6 (quoting INT’L. FIN. INST. ADVISORY 
COMM’N, FINAL REPORT TO THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE (2000)). 
169. Id. (quoting INT’L. FIN. INST. ADVISORY COMM’N., FINAL REPORT TO THE 
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE (2000)).  See generally Erbeznik, supra note 160 
(discussing in detail how foreign aid negatively affects reform efforts). 
170. Knack, supra note 160, at 3. 
171. E.g., Djankov et al., supra note 154, at 7. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id.  
175. Id. at 7-8. 
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Similarly, the United Nations (U.N.) gave food aid to Somalia in 
the early 1990s.176  It was not effective.177  Indeed, “[d]uring the 
famine of 1991 and 1992, warlords and militiamen looted a substantial 
amount of the food distributed by aid groups . . . .”178  Evidence 
suggests that this looting resulted in Somalia’s civil war and 
subsequent fighting over which faction would control the aid.179  
Despite this, USAID recently announced $20 million in new 
American food aid to Somalia.180 
Thus, any connection between multilateral foreign humanitarian 
aid to the welfare and defense of the United States is virtually 
nonexistent for two reasons.  First, multilateral organizations are 
generally precluded from promoting democratization, which is 
arguably the most related justification to the defense and welfare of 
the United States.  And, second, foreign humanitarian aid through 
multilateral organizations has proven ineffective.   
3.  Neither Bilateral nor Multilateral Humanitarian Foreign Aid 
Serves Any Purpose Directly Related to the Defense and Welfare of 
the United States 
Whether through bilateral or multilateral methods, foreign 
humanitarian aid does not plausibly contribute to the defense or 
welfare of the United States.181  Democratization is the only 
congressional justification for spending on foreign humanitarian aid 
that comes close to being for the common defense and general welfare 
of the United States.  However, most multilateral agencies are 
176. Marion Nestle & Sharron Dalton, Food Aid and International Hunger 
Crises: The United States in Somalia 11 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 19 (Fall 1994); 
Eleanor West, Stolen Food Aid Crisis Hits Somalia, FOOD REPUBLIC (Aug. 17, 
2011, 4:01 PM), http://www.foodrepublic.com/2011/08/17/stolen-food-aid-crisis-
hits-somalia. 
177. Nestle & Dalton, supra note 177, at 19; West, supra note 177; Djankov et 
al., supra note 154, at 8; Knack, supra note 160, at 6.  
178. West, supra note 177. 
179. Djankov et al., supra note 154, at 8; Knack, supra note 160, at 6.  
180. Mohammed Ibrahim, Somalia: U.S. Promises More Food Aid, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2013, at A6. 
181. See James Bovard, The Continuing Failure of Foreign Aid, CATO INST. 
(Jan. 31, 1986), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa065.html, for a discussion on the 
ineffectiveness of foreign humanitarian aid.  
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precluded from promoting or advocating democratization,182 and the 
previously mentioned evidence shows that bilateral and multilateral 
aid are ineffective.183 
Examples of these propositions in action are the fairly recent 
events in the West Bank and Egypt.  The United States has spent 
billions of dollars in bilateral and multilateral foreign humanitarian aid 
for the West Bank and Gaza Strip alone.184  Instead of promoting 
democracy, both Egypt and the West Bank “elected” anti-U.S. 
governments.185  The Muslim Brotherhood took power in Egypt186 
and Hamas took control of the Palestinian Legislative Council in the 
West Bank.187  Each of these newly elected governments is anti-
United States.  Therefore, any positive connection between the 
182. Knack, supra note 160, at 3.  
183. See supra text accompanying notes 155-81. 
184. JIM ZANOTTI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22967, U.S. FOREIGN AID TO 
THE PALESTINIANS 26 (2013), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22967.pdf (noting that, since “the mid-1990s, 
the U.S. government has committed more than $4 billion in bilateral assistance to 
the Palestinians . . . who are among the largest per capita recipients of foreign aid 
worldwide”).  
185. Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T 
OF STATE (SEPT. 28, 2012), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm 
(noting that Hamas was designated a foreign terrorist organization by the State 
Department on October 8, 1997); Erick Stakelbeck, Muslim Brotherhood: A Global 
Terrorist Influence, CBN NEWS (Feb. 1, 2011), 
http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2011/february/muslim-brotherhood-a-global-
terrorist-influence/ (noting that Hamas considers itself the “Palestinian branch” of 
the Muslim Brotherhood); Mary Crane, Does the Muslim Brotherhood Have Ties to 
Terrorism?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (April 5, 2005), 
http://www.cfr.org/egypt/does-muslim-brotherhood-have-ties-terrorism/p9248 
(noting that while Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood is not listed by the U.S. State 
Department as a terrorist organization, Hamas, Jamaat al-Islamiyya, and al-Qaeda 
are all designated terrorist organizations with historical and ideological ties with the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood). 
186. Zachary Laub, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., 
http://www.cfr.org/africa/egypts-muslim-brotherhood/p23991 (last updated Jan. 15, 
2014). 
187. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 155, at 10; The World Factbook, CIA, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html (select 
“Background”) (last updated Mar. 21, 2013); see Profile: Hamas Palestinian 
Movement, BBC (Dec. 6, 2012, 10:31 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-13331522 (discussing Hamas’ Palestinian victory). 
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billions in foreign humanitarian aid to the welfare and defense of the 
United States is questionable at best. 
Michael Scheuer, head of the CIA’s Osama bin Laden unit in the 
late 1990s, expands on this lack of a positive connection between U.S. 
intervention and the welfare and defense of the United States.188  
Scheuer notes that bin Laden’s followers are held together by a hatred 
for U.S. foreign policy.189  Thus, rather than humanitarian aid 
contributing to the welfare and defense of the United States, Scheuer 
argues the opposite: U.S. foreign humanitarian aid jeopardizes the 
safety of Americans.190 
Robert Pape provides support for this argument.191  Pape, a 
specialist in international security affairs and director of the Chicago 
Project on Security and Terrorism,192 analyzed 462 suicide terrorist 
attacks conducted between 1980 and 2004.193  He noted that rather 
than religious fundamentalism, the primary motivation of the terrorists 
he studied was to force democracies out of the terrorists’ 
“homeland.”194  Pape supports this assertion by noting that al-Qaeda 
followers are ten times as likely to come from countries with a U.S. 
presence.195  These facts demonstrate that U.S. foreign humanitarian 
aid does not have a positive effect on the welfare and defense of the 
United States.  Rather, it puts U.S. welfare and defense in jeopardy. 
The Founding Fathers likely foresaw the negative effect that 
foreign entanglements would have on the welfare and defense of the 
188. PAUL, supra note 25, at 15, 18-19. 
189. Id. at 18 (citing Michael Scheuer, Press Conference at the National Press 
Club (May 2007)). 
190. See id. at 18-19 (citing Michael Scheuer, Press Conference at the 
National Press Club (May 2007)) (noting that Philip Giraldi, a former CIA 
counterterrorism expert, agrees that the U.S. intervention has the consequence of 
anti-U.S. sentiment and actions); see also Adelman, supra note 2, at 64 (citing 
economists as arguing that aid incentivizes governments not to make changes as 
long as they continue to expect aid from foreign donors). 
191. Robert Pape, UCHICAGO NEWS, http://news.uchicago.edu/profile/robert-
pape (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). 
192. Id. 
193. PAUL, supra note 25, at 20.  Pape compiled the suicide terrorist attacks 
into a database and analyzed them for his book, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic 
of Suicide Terrorism (2005).  Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id.  
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United States.  In his 1801 inaugural address, Jefferson famously 
stated, “Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations—
entangling alliances with none.”196  Washington similarly stated that 
the United States’ “true policy [is] to steer clear of permanent 
alliances with any portion of the foreign world.”197  He believed the 
United States should work with foreign countries in the commercial 
arena, but apply its commercial policy equally and impartially without 
special favors or preferences.198  The more involved the United States 
was with foreign countries, the more the United States’ destiny, peace, 
and prosperity would become intertwined with the international 
community.199 
V.  HUMAN SUFFERING ELICITS EMOTIONS THAT CAUSE CONGRESS TO 
IGNORE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
If foreign aid is unconstitutional, why has Congress continually 
allocated billions of taxpayer dollars for it?  Human suffering 
naturally elicits strong emotional responses.200  For example, when 
196. PAUL, supra note 25, at 9 (citing President Thomas Jefferson, First 
Inaugural Address (1801)) (emphasis added). 
197. President George Washington, Farewell Address (1796), in S. DOC. NO. 
106-21, at 27 (2000).  Washington cited Europe as a prime example of why the 
United States should maintain as “little political connection as possible” with 
foreign nations.  Id. at 26.  Europe’s numerous foreign connections meant “she must 
be engaged in frequent controversies.”  Id. at 26.  Therefore, the United States 
should limit foreign connections to avoid foreign entanglements.  Id. 
198. PAUL, supra note 25, at 9 (citing President George Washington, Farewell 
Address (1796)). 
199. Id. (citing President George Washington, Farewell Address (1796)).  
President John Quincy Adams would likely have rejected U.S. membership in 
international organizations such as the United Nations. Id. at 13 (citing John Quincy 
Adams, Speech to the U.S. House of Representatives on Foreign Policy (July 4, 
1821)).  Adams stressed that once the United States acted “under other banners than 
her own,” it would not be able to “extricat[e]” itself.  Id. (Adams also stated that 
America “is the champion and vindicator only of her own.  She will commend the 
general cause by the . . . benignant sympathy of her example.  [America] knows that 
by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of 
foreign independence, [America] would involve herself beyond the power of 
extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and 
ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom”). 
200. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 202-33. 
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discussing whether to aid French refugees, Representative Nicholas 
agreed with both Madison and Giles that he did not know “upon what 
authority the House were to grant the proposed donation.”201  He 
stated that while providing this “charity” would be “extremely 
laudable,” it was beyond congressional authority.202  Despite its 
unconstitutionality, Nicholas admitted he would vote for granting aid 
because of the emigrants’ suffering.203  He reaffirmed his belief in the 
unconstitutionality of the aid when he stated he would have to return 
to his constituents and “honestly tell them that he considered himself 
as having exceeded his powers.”204 
Emotions have not always resulted in the disregarding of the 
Constitution.  An example of this occurred in 1796.205  That year 
much of Savannah, Georgia was destroyed by a fire.206  Though he did 
not cite Madison, Representative Macon used Madison’s 
constitutional interpretation to explain why the federal government 
could not provide aid to Savannah.207  Macon sympathized with 
Savannah’s residents.208  Although he felt sympathy for them, he “felt 
as tenderly for the Constitution.”209  The damage was confined to 
Savannah and was therefore not “general” for purposes of Congress’ 
spending power.210  Therefore, relief would not be for the “general 
welfare of the United States.”211  Because the Constitution only 
authorized relief for the “common defense” or “general welfare,” it 
201. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 172 (1794); see supra notes 134-44. 
202. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 170 (1794); see also Chakravarty, supra note 157, at 
310 (“humanitarian and developmental aid” is a “laudable moral objective . . . that 
captures the spirit of [Americans]”). 
203. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 172 (1794). 
204. Id. 
205. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1712 (1796).  
206. Id. 
207. See id. at 1717. 
208. Id.  Macon’s sympathy for those who were suffering was reminiscent of 
Madison’s sympathy for the French emigrants two years before. 
209. Id. 
210. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
211. Id. (emphasis added). 
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did not authorize this aid; Macon would therefore not vote to 
authorize it.212 
Several representatives agreed that the federal government could 
not constitutionally provide aid to Savannah because the government 
was limited to spending for the “general welfare” and “common 
defense” of the United States.213  For example, Representative Moore 
noted that individuals could contribute to those suffering in 
Savannah.214  However, it was not constitutional to provide federal 
relief.215  The federal government only has the power that the 
Constitution gave to it.216  Charity simply does not fall within 
Congress’ spending authority under the “general [w]elfare” clause.217 
Proponents of authorizing aid to Savannah cited two examples of 
when the federal government had provided what they called foreign 
aid.218  The first was when the United States gave aid to French 
refugees from St. Domingo.219  The second was when the United 
States gave money to the daughters of the Count de Grasse.220  
However, these cited examples were notably different from the case of 
the people of Savannah.221  For the French refugees, the aid was a 
212. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1719 (1796) (Representative Kitchell also doubted 
the constitutionality as well as the effectiveness of the proposed aid).  
213. Id. at 1719-20 (Representatives Kitchell and Moore agreed aid to 
Savannah was not general enough to justify aid under Congress’ taxing and 
spending authority).  
214. Id. at 1718. 
215. Id. 
216. See id. at 1723.  
217. Id.  In 1827, Congressman (and Colonel) Davy Crocket addressed the 
unconstitutionality of federal government charity.  STEPHENS, supra note 80, at 100.  
He noted that individuals have the right to give their money for charitable purposes.  
Id.  However, Congress does not have the same power with the public’s money.  Id.  
President Franklin Pierce similarly believed that government funded charity was 
unconstitutional.  Id. at 100-01.  In 1854, he vetoed a bill to “help the mentally ill.”  
Id.  He stated that he “cannot find any authority in the Constitution for public 
charity.  To approve such spending would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution and subversive to the whole theory upon which the Union of these 
States is founded.”  Id. 
218. See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1723-24 (1796). 
219. Id. at 1724. 
220. Id.  
221. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 169 (1794); 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1712-27 (1796). 
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loan that was repaid to the United States.222  In the case of the 
daughters of the Count de Grasse, the federal government paid in 
consideration of their father’s past services to the United States.223  
Therefore, these two cases were arguably authorized by Congress’ 
taxing and spending power.224 
These historical debates demonstrate how emotions can result in a 
disregarding of the Constitution.  This is likely the reason that foreign 
aid for humanitarian reasons or in response to natural disasters is the 
least contested form of foreign aid.225 
Closely tied with the emotional aspect of humanitarian aid is the 
argument that the United States has a moral imperative to offer this 
kind of assistance.226  Proponents of foreign humanitarian aid argue 
that foreign humanitarian aid “advances American moral values . . . by 
saving lives, fighting poverty and hunger, combating infectious 
diseases like HIV/AIDS, promoting education, and bolstering 
democratic institutions.”227  This argument ignores the duty that is 
owed to support and defend the Constitution of the United States.228 
As Alexander Hamilton eloquently put it: 
What is the most sacred duty, and the greatest source of security in 
a republic?  [T]he answer would be, [a]n inviolable respect for the 
Constitution and laws—the first growing out of the last . . . .  
. . . .  
222. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1724 (1796).  
223. Id.  The Count de Grasse led a French fleet at the battle of Yorktown 
against the British during the American Revolution.  Victory at Yorktown, HISTORY 
CHANNEL, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/victory-at-yorktown (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
224. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.   
225. LAWSON & TARNOFF, supra note 1, at 3. 
226. Id.; Wiese, supra note 1, at 763; see, e.g., FPI Analysis, supra note 158 
(arguing that foreign aid “advances America’s moral values”).   
227. FPI Analysis, supra note 158; see also supra text accompanying notes 
161-71 (discussing the ineffectiveness of foreign humanitarian aid in advancing 
democratization). 
228. See Act to Regulate the Time and Manner of Administering Certain 
Oaths, 1 Stat. 23-24 (1789). 
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 . . . [A] sacred respect for the constitutional law is the vital 
principle, the sustaining energy, of a free government.229 
Duty to support the Constitution was important to the Framers of 
the Constitution.230  Article VI of the Constitution mandates that 
senators, representatives, and executive and judicial officers of the 
federal and state governments take an oath to “support the 
Constitution of the United States.”231  It was the first session of the 
First Congress that specified the time and manner of these oaths.232 
One’s own idea of morality may not always be supported by the 
Constitution.  For instance, congressional representatives may decide 
government-funded foreign humanitarian aid is consistent with their 
own morals.  However, the oath public officeholders take upon 
entering office means that whether an act is consistent with one’s 
beliefs is irrelevant.  The question is whether such an act is 
constitutionally authorized.233 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
John Quincy Adams proclaimed that rather than intervene, the 
United States needed to respect the sovereignty of other countries.234  
The United States must abstain from intervention, “‘even when the 
conflict has been for principles to which she clings as to the last vital 
229. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, TULLY NO. III (Aug. 28, 1794), reprinted in 17 
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AUG. 1794-DEC.1794, 159-61 (Harold C. 
Syrett ed., Columbia University Press 1972), available at 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-17-02-0130. 
230. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
231. Id. 
232. See Act to Regulate the Time and Manner of Administering Certain 
Oaths, 1 Stat. 23-24 (1789). 
233. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 173 (1794).  “Under the guise of interpreting the 
Constitution we must take care that we do not import into the discussion our own 
personal views of what would be wise, just and fitting rules of government to be 
adopted by a free people and confound them with constitutional limitations.”  
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106-07 (1908).  
234. PAUL, supra note 25, at 12-13 (citing John Quincy Adams, Speech to the 
U.S. House of Representatives on Foreign Policy (July 4, 1821)). 
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drop that visits the heart.’”235  Adams believed that while the United 
States “‘is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all.  
She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.’”236  Rather than 
intervene, the best thing the United States could do is provide an 
example of true democracy.237 
Henry Clay reiterated Adams’ thoughts when he stated that the 
United States should refrain from intervening in the affairs of other 
countries and instead provide a “model” that other countries could 
follow.238  Clay noted that the United States served its own interests 
and the interests of liberty by avoiding foreign attachments and living 
according to its democratic values.239 
Despite the wise words of Adams and Clay, the warnings of our 
Founding Fathers about foreign entanglements, constitutional 
limitations, and the unwise policy of foreign intervention, the United 
States provided 149 countries foreign humanitarian aid in 2011.240  
Unfortunately, neither the Supreme Court nor Congress is likely to 
stop the unconstitutional practice of foreign humanitarian aid.  The 
Supreme Court is not likely to stop this unconstitutional spending 
because it has held national security and foreign policy nonjusticiable 
political questions.241  Nonjusticiability means that Congress is 
235. Id. at 13 (quoting John Quincy Adams, Speech to the U.S. House of 
Representatives on Foreign Policy (July 4, 1821)) 
236. Id.  
237. Id.  
238. Id. at 14 (citing Henry Clay). 
239. Id. 
240. John Norris, Interactive Map: Foreign Aid, Country-by-Country 
Assistance for 2011, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 19, 2012), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2012/03/19/11328/interactive
-map-foreign-aid/.  Paul D. Miller, a former Director for Afghanistan in the National 
Security Council under Presidents Bush and Obama, is cited as saying the United 
States provides foreign aid to “select countries.”  FPI Analysis, supra note 158.  
Considering that the United States only recognizes 195 independent states, 
providing aid to 149 is hardly selective.  Independent States in the World, BUREAU 
OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Dec. 9, 2013), 
http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm. 
241. See e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 US 763, 789 (1950) (dismissing 
claims by enemy aliens that effectively challenged the propriety of US military 
presence in China); see also Sarnoff v. Connally, 457 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1972) 
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relatively unchecked in its foreign policy.242  Congress is similarly 
unlikely to stop this unconstitutional spending.243  Therefore, because 
neither Congress nor the Supreme Court is likely to do their respective 
jobs of upholding the Constitution, it is up to the American people to 
redress this unconstitutional spending.244 
Ending the federal funding of foreign humanitarian aid would not 
mean, however, the end of all foreign humanitarian aid.  A “Hudson 
Institute study found that in 2006, Americans voluntarily contributed 
three-times” the amount of aid provided by the government.245  
Therefore, proponents of foreign humanitarian aid do not need to 
worry that ending government-funded foreign humanitarian aid would 
end all U.S. foreign humanitarian aid.246  It will only end aid that is 
taken from Americans in the form of taxes. 
 
  
(noting that foreign affairs are within the “exclusive province of Congress and the 
Executive”). 
242. See Christopher R. Chase, Note, The Political Question Doctrine: 
Preventing the Challenge of U.S. Foreign Policy in 767 Third Avenue Associates v. 
Consulate General of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 
1045, 1045-46 (2001) (stating that the “political question doctrine limits judicial” 
intervention into questions “best left to the discretion of Congress or the Executive 
Branch”). 
243. See supra Part V (discussing the sympathy factor that contributes to 
unconstitutional spending). 
244. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton). 
245. Adelman, supra note 2, at 64 (citing the Hudson Institute’s 2007 Index of 
Global Philanthropy); see also PAUL, supra note 25, at 102. 
246. But cf. Natsios, supra note 2 (arguing that privatizing foreign 
humanitarian aid is not a sufficient substitution for government-funded foreign 
humanitarian aid because private aid “does not go to the countries and challenges 
U.S. government policy makers deem central to U.S. national interest”).  Natsios 
argues that minimal private aid “supports democracy and good governance 
programs” despite their importance to “build[ing] functioning states in countries 
coming out of a period of dictatorship.”  Id. 
 
36
California Western Law Review, Vol. 50 [2013], No. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol50/iss1/4
Alkire Final Camera Ready.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2014  10:21 AM 
2013] UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF GOV’T-FUNDED FOREIGN AID 111 
The government works for the American people.  It is therefore 
up to the American people to ensure the government is abiding by its 
constitutional limitations.  If proponents of foreign humanitarian aid 
feel strongly enough about foreign humanitarian aid, they can donate 
privately or amend the Constitution consistent with the Constitution’s 
Article V. 
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